NOTES
AGE DISCRIMINATION-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND
SUFFERING HELD RECOVERABLE

UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINA-

1967-Rogers v. Exxon Research
& Engineering Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF

At the age of sixty, Dr. Dilworth T. Rogers, a "scientist and
inventor," was forced into an early retirement by the Exxon Research
& Engineering Company,' after approximately thirty years of
employment. 2 Dr. Rogers subsequently brought an action in federal
district court alleging that Exxon, in compelling his retirement, had
discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).3 Following
the death of Dr. Rogers, his wife and daughter, as co-executrices of
his estate, became the plaintiffs in the proceeding. 4 The trial was
then bifurcated, and the issues of liability and damages were decided
separately. 5
At the trial on the issue of liability, the jury found the actions of
Exxon in terminating the employment of the plaintiffs' decedent to be
violative of the ADEA. 6 Prior to the trial on the question of damages,
the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to place in issue their claims
7
for compensatory damages for pain and suffering under the ADEA,
1 At the time of these events the defendant was named Esso Research & Engineering Company. In 1974, however, the defendant changed its corporate name to Exxon
Research & Engineering Company. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F.
Supp. 324, 326 (D.N.J. 1975).
2 Id. at 326, 329-30. Dr. Rogers was initially employed by Exxon as a research
chemist from 1938 to 1940. After a one-year period of employment with another company, he returned to Exxon and worked continuously there until the date of his early
retirement. Brief for Defendant at 3, Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F.
Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant].
3 Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.N.J. 1975). The
ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1976).
4 Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.N.J. 1975).
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See Defendant's Supplemental Trial Brief at 1, Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r
Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975). Compensatory damages are "substitutionary relief"
in the sense that they provide
the plaintiff money mainly by way of compensation, to make up for some loss
that was not, originally, a money loss, but one that ordinarily may be measured
in money.
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despite the absence of any express statutory authorization for such
recovery. 8 After all the evidence had been presented, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $750,000, which
was subsequently reduced to $200,000 on remittitur. 9
In an opinion intended to explain and justify certain rulings in
the case, the federal district court held in Rogers v. Exxon Research
& Engineering Co. 10 that, in an appropriate case, damages for pain
and suffering are recoverable under the ADEA. 1 1 It was asserted that
the statute, in effect, creates a new tort for the redress of which the
full array of tort remedies is available to an aggrieved party, once
liability is established.' 2 The court also analogized the ADEA to title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196413 in order to illustrate both the
broad remedial purpose of the ADEA and the suitability of awards for
pain and suffering where compensation for discriminatory treatment is
sought.' 4 Since recovery appeared to be consonant with the declared
purpose of the Act'" and with its legislative history, 16 the court concluded that the language in the enforcement provision of the ADEA
was broad enough to permit the award of compensatory damages for
17
pain and suffering.
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1, at 135 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as DOBBS].
8 The enforcement provision of the ADEA provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]n any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction
to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under
this section.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
9 Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (D.N.J. 1975).
The term "remittitur" refers to a procedure whereby a court, usually on motion of the
losing defendant, gives the plaintiff the option of either remitting that portion of the
jury verdict found to be excessive or submitting to a new trial. See generally 6A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.05[3] (2d ed. 1974).
10 404 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D.N.J. 1975).
11Id. at 333.
12 Id. at 327.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-11 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1976).
14404 F. Supp. at 328, 331.
15 The congressionally stated purposes of the ADEA are
to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.

29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
16 See note 70 infra.
17 404 F. Supp. at 328-29, 330 & n.3, 333.
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Congress enacted the ADEA, pursuant to its powers under the
commerce clause, 18 for the stated goal of "promot[ing] employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age."' 19 In order to
accomplish this purpose, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary age
discrimination2 ° by employers, 2 ' employment agencies, 22 and labor
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1970), in which appears the congressional finding that
"the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce."
1929 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). For other stated congressional purposes of the statute
see note 15 supra.
20 Such discrimination occurs when
age, within the limits prescribed by the Act, is [treated as] a determiningfactor
in making any decision regarding hiring, dismissal, promotion or any other
term, condition or privilege of employment of an individual.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c) (1975) (emphasis added).
21The term "employer," as used in the ADEA, signifies
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30,
1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or
political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State
or a political subdivision of a State and any interstate agency, but such term
does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the
Government of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (Supp. V, 1976).
It should be noted that the ADEA purports to extend its coverage to the states and
their political subdivisions qua employers. See id. In the recent case of National League
of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976), the Supreme Court held that certain amendments to the federal minimum wage law which purported to extend coverage to virtually all employees of states and their political subdivisions were unconstitutional. Id. at
2473-74. The Usery Court held that insofar as the challenged legislation tended to "interfere with the integral governmental functions of [the state]" it was beyond the
power of Congress under the commerce clause. Id. at 2474. In reaching such a decision,
the Court indicated
that the States as States stand on a quite different footing than an individual or
a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate
commerce.
Id. at 2475. Inasmuch as the ADEA is also an exercise of Congress' power under the
commerce clause, see note 18 supra, it is unclear whether the hiring or firing of employees by a state on the basis of age, as opposed to a decision regarding the wages to
be paid them, would be the type of "integral governmental function" which must be
left to the discretion of the states. See id. at 2488 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (federal government may force states to act impartially when hiring or discharging).
22The ADEA defines "employment agency" as
any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer and includes an agent of such a person; but shall not
include an agency of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (Supp. V, 1976).
An administrative regulation issued under the statute states that if an employment
agency secures employees on a regular basis for at least one employer covered by the
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organizations2 3 against "individuals who are at least forty . . .but less
than sixty-five years of age." 2 4 The employer, in particular, is prohibited from discriminating not only in hiring and discharge practices,
but also with respect to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or
25
privileges of employment."
Differential treatment of workers in matters related to employment, otherwise prohibited by the ADEA, may be defended and justified in three situations. First, no actionable discrimination will be
found "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably

ADEA, the agency comes tinder the act "with respect to all of its activities whether they
be for covered or non-covered employers." 29 C.F.R. § 860.35(b) (1975). This regulation
was given judicial approval in Brennan v. Root, 8 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9531, at 5335
(E.D.N.C. 1974). Thus, "the ADEA indirectly governs even the non-covered employer
by denying him access to the resources of employment agencies" that do business with
at least one covered employer. Comment, Age Discrimination in Employment: Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 281, 286 (1975).
23The term "labor organization" is defined by the ADEA to include
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent
of such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency,
or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged
which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (1970).
24 Id. § 631. The lower age limit was established at forty on the basis of testimony
that this was "the age at which age discrimination in employment becomes evident."
H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967). See Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1967). Sixty-five was chosen as the upper age limit by the drafters of
the ADEA apparently for no better reason than its prior use by the drafters of the 1935
Social Security Act. See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1332-33 (1974). At
present, however, there are numerous bills pending in Congress which propose to remove the upper age of sixty-five from the ADEA. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF
1967: A REPORT COVERING ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ACT DURING 1975, at 19 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION REPORT].
For more extensive discussion of the ADEA's selective protection of the age group
of forty to sixty-five see Agatstein, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967:
A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F. 309, 321-23 (1973); Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DUQ. L. REV.
227, 229-30 & nn.14-16 (1974); Note, supra at 1331-36. See generally Comment, Age
Discriminationand the Over-Sixty-Five Worker, 3 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 333
(1972); Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: The Problem of the Worker Over
Sixty-five, 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 484 (1974).
25 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1970). For an administrative interpretation of the phrase,
with examples, see 29 C.F.R. § 860.50(c) (1975).
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necessary to the normal operation of the particular business,"2 6 or
where the differentiation between workers is based on considerations
other than age.2 7 Second, no violation of the statute will be deemed
to have occurred where the action complained of was taken pursuant
to a bona fide seniority system or employee benefit plan. 2 8 Finally,
employers may freely exercise their prerogative to punish or fire employees for "good cause." 2 9 These defenses are to be construed in
such a way that the broad underlying purpose of the ADEA might
best be effectuated. 30
The ADEA has also incorporated certain enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 3 1 including the section which authorizes suits by the Secretary of Labor.3 2 Pursuant
to the statutory scheme of the ADEA, a private individual contemplating an action under the Act must notify the Secretary of Labor
of his intention within a prescribed period of time following the al26 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). It is the position of the Wage & Hour Division of the
Department of Labor that the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception
should "have limited scope and application" and should be interpreted "narrowly
[with] the burden of proof in establishing that it applies" on the party asserting the
defense. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1975). Despite the mandate, however, the cases arising
under the ADEA thus far reported have generally upheld the BFOQ defense, where it
has been raised. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 CCH
Empl. Prac. Dec. 7795 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
The BFOQ exception is also incorporated into the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1972). For a complete discussion of this section
and its treatment by the courts see Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1176-86
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
27 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). This defense, like the BFOQ exception, is to "be

construed narrowly, [with] the burden of proof in establishing the applicability of the
exception" upon the party relying upon it. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(e) (1975).
2829 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970). The system may not be a "subterfuge to evade the
purposes" of the ADEA, id., and, in order to be bona fide, must be both based upon
seniority and uniformly applied. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.105(a), (c) (1975).
29 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1970).
30 See notes 27-29 supra. With respect to the weight to be accorded the regulations
issued by an administrative agency, it is settled doctrine that such regulations are entitled to great deference and generally will be given effect judicially. See, e.g., Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); Budd Co. v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201,
204-05 (3d Cir. 1975).
31 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1976).
32 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Supp. V, 1976) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970)).
The other incorporated provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are 29 U.S.C.
§ 211(b) (1970) (power of secretary to use state agencies), id. § 216(b) (penalties for
violation of statute), id. § 216(d) (limitations on actions), and id. § 217 (jurisdiction to
enjoin violations). See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Supp. V, 1976).
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leged discriminatory practice. 3 3 The Secretary must then attempt
to exact voluntary compliance with the Act through "informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion- 34 and, failing this,
may initiate a suit to enjoin such discrimination. 35 If the Secretary
either brings suit to enforce the rights of the aggrieved party3 6 or
obtains voluntary compliance with the terms of the Act, the right of
the private individual to bring an action is terminated. 37 Should the
Secretary fail to initiate suit, the aggrieved individual may then personally seek "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of [the Act]." 38 The nature of the relief requested in the pro39
ceeding determines whether the right to trial by jury attaches.
33 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1970). The requisite notice must be given within 180 days
of the alleged unlawful act and at least 60 days prior to instituting suit. Id. Such notice
requirements have been considered jurisdictional prerequisites to an action under the
Act and, as a result, failure to satisfy either of the notice requirements will result in
dismissal. See, e.g., Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir.
1974); Cebhard v. GAF Corp., 59 F.R.D. 504, 507 (D.D.C. 1973); Balc v. United Steelworkers of America, 6 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8948, at 6039 (W.D. Pa. 1973). But see
Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 7 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9214, at 7049 (D.D.C. 1974) (failure
of employer to post conspicuous notice of applicability of ADEA excused plaintiff's
noncompliance with notice requirements).
For a more detailed discussion of the various procedural obstacles confronting a
litigant in an action under the ADEA see Comment, supra note 22, at 286-89; Comment, ProceduralAspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U.
PITT. L. REV. 914, 916-28 (1975).
34 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970). A mere perfunctory attempt by the Secretary to achieve
voluntary compliance is not sufficient. Rather, some type of good-faith affirmative effort
must be shown. See Brennan v, Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 375 & n.12 (8th Cir.
1974) (three conversations between company official and compliance officer, at which
no attempt was made by the compliance officer to seek back wages for aggrieved employee, held insufficient to satisfy the conciliation requirements).
35 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970)). Under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970), "the Secretary of Labor is vested
with the exclusive authority for filing a suit . . . to restrain . . . violation" of that statute.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1105,

1121 (E.D. Pa. 1973), modified on other grounds, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). This section is expressly incorporated by reference into the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
36 When the Secretary brings an action to enjoin the alleged age discrimination pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970), the defendant has no right to a jury trial. Hodgson v.
Bowman, 4 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 7601, at 5379-80 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
37 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1970).
38M.
39 See Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974),
wherein the court was confronted with an issue of first impression-namely, whether
the constitutional right to jury trial attaches to "an action for damages, lost wages and
benefits, liquidated damages, costs and attorney fees" under the ADEA. Id. at 661-62.
In its analysis of the question, the court noted that
[w]hen Congress mandated that actions brought under § 626 were to be
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Once such an action is brought, the plaintiff need only establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination. 40 Thereafter, the burden of
producing evidence to show that the actions were nondiscriminatory
4
shifts to the defendant. '
deemed actions under [the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,] 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216(b), 217, the right to a jury trial in § 626 actions necessarily became
dependent on whether such [a] right exists for § 216 or § 217 claims.
370 F. Supp. at 664 (footnote omitted). It was ultimately held that the right to jury trial
under the ADEA did attach because damages are traditionally considered a legal remedy and "the case law overwhelmingly supports the right to jury trial in § 216 private
damage actions." Id. at 665.
A seemingly contrary result was reached in the more recent case of Pons v. Lorrillard, 69 F.R.D. 576 (M.D.N.C. 1976). In Pons, the court was faced with essentially the
same issue presented in Chilton, that is, whether there is a right to a jury trial in "an
action for . . . reinstatement, lost wages, liquidated damages, and costs and attorney
fees" pursuant to the ADEA. Id. at 576. In contrast to the Chilton court's reliance upon
the enforcement machinery of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Pons court
considered ADEA actions to be more closely analogous to those brought under title VII.
Id. at 579. It was therefore held that the back pay was "an integral part of [the
injunctive] relief" sought, so that the plaintiff was not entitled to a trial by jury on the
issue. Id.
For a discussion of the jury trial right in the context of title VII litigation see
Developments, supra note 26, at 1264-69. See generally Comment, The Seventh
Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L.
REV. 503, 524-27 (1973).
40 To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination the plaintiff must show not
only "that he [is] within the protected age group and that he was adversely affected by
an employment decision," Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 7 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 9214, at
7049 (D.D.C. 1974), but also that the acts were prompted by arbitrary age discrimination. See Hart v. United Steelworkers of America, 350 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
appeal dismissed as moot, 482 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1973); Kincaid v. United Steelworkers
of America, 5 CCH Empl. Prac. Dec. 8462, at 7261 (N.D. Ind. 1972). Cf. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), wherein the more stringent criteria
for a prima facie case under title VII were articulated.
For a more detailed discussion of the requirements for a prima facie case under the
ADEA see Comment, supra note 22, at 308-12; Note, Proving DiscriminationUnder the
Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 495, 504-08 (1975); Note, Age
Discriminationin Employment Under Federal Law, 9 GA. ST. B.J. 114, 118-21 (1972).
41 Although many courts speak in terms of shifting the "burden of proof" once a
prima facie case of age discrimination has been established, see, e.g., Shultz v. Hickok
Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208, 1213-14 (N.D. Ga. 1973), it is more precise to speak in
terms of the specific burden of producing evidence. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. For
example, in a recent Fifth Circuit decision, the court noted that the establishment of a
prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA results in the shifting of the
burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant-employer. Bittar v. Air
Canada, 512 F.2d 582, 582 (5th Cir. 1975).
There is an apparent disagreement, however, regarding the effect of a prima facie
case upon the remaining evidentiary burdens-namely, the burden of pleading and the
burden of persuasion. See MCCORMICK, supra, §§ 336-37, 339-41. For example, in Bittar v. Air Canada, supra at 583, the Fifth Circuit indicated that, notwithstanding the fact
that the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to the defendant-employer after
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The absence of an express reference to compensatory damages in
the ADEA itself, as well as the lack of legal precedent for the award
of such damages, 4 2 led the Rogers court to construct a rationale based
largely upon deductive reasoning. In so doing, both the letter and
spirit of the ADEA were considered and relied upon in order to justify the allowance of recovery for pain and suffering under the statute.
The Rogers court first concluded that the ADEA, in essence,
created "a new statutory tort." 43 Reference was made to other civil
rights legislation which had been interpreted by the courts as establishing legal duties, for the breach of which damages are available to
the aggrieved parties. 44 Particular attention was paid to a pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court, which stated that
where there has been an infringement of a legal right protected by a
federal statute providing " 'a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done.' -45 Drawing upon these principles and having earlier found
that the ADEA does indeed create a legal duty, the Rogers court
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the ultimate burden of persuasion-the burden of establishing a case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence
-remains with the plaintiff. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has adopted the view that
[tihe existence of a bona fide occupational qualification is an affirmative
defense, and the burden is on appellee to show that its admittedly discriminatory hiring policy is justified.
Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387, 389 (6th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added). It appears
that the burden to which the Roberts court referred is the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defense asserted is valid.
Similarly, the characterization by the Roberts court of BFOQ as an affirmative defense indicates that the burden of pleading such a defense is upon the defendantemployer since the general rule is that such a defense is waived by the defendant if he
has not pleaded it affirmatively. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 49, at 146 (1965).
For a general discussion of the analytical distinctions encompassed by the term
"burden of proof" see id. §§ 7.5-7.8; MCCORMICK, supra, §§ 336-41; 24 BAYLOR L.
REV. 601, 607-09 (1972).
42 There was precedent for the allowance of various equitable remedies under the
Act. See, e.g., Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
where the court indicated that the aggrieved party may seek such remedies as back
wages, reinstatement, and injunctive relief. Id. at 234-35 (dictum).
43 404 F. Supp. at 327.
4 Id. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (federal statute proscribing deprivation of constitutional rights by state officials provides remedy for persons victimized); cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1143 (4th
Cir. 1975) (action brought under a federal statute proscribing racial discrimination is
essentially one for redress of a tort).
For a more detailed discussion of tort liability under title VII see Developments,
supra note 26, at 1259; Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination under
Title VII, 54 VA. L. REV. 491, 497-504 (1968).
45 404 F. Supp. at 328 (quoting from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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concluded that "[o]nce liability is established under the statute . . .
the panoply of usual tort remedies is available to recompense injured
4
parties for all provable damages." 6
The analogy drawn between the ADEA and title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196447 was employed in order to illustrate both the
broad remedial purpose of the ADEA4 8 and the suitability of awards
for pain and suffering in redressing discriminatory conduct. 49 Title
VII, in general terms, prohibits discrimination in employment based
upon "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 50 The Rogers
court relied upon a recent Supreme Court case for the proposition
that title VII was meant " 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered
on account of unlawful employment discrimination.' -51 Viewed
against this background, the court found that the ADEA embodied
the same "make whole" purpose as title VII. 52 Thus, the issue was
reduced to a determination of whether this purpose was intended to
be effectuated by allowing the particular relief sought. To decide this
question, the court examined the enforcement provisions of the
ADEA and of title VII.
In contrast to the ADEA, 5 3 the enforcement provision of title
VII, on its face, appears to limit the available remedies to equitable
relief. 54 Such a construction was adopted in Van Hoomissen v. Xerox
Corp. 55 wherein the court held that neither compensatory nor puni46

404 F. Supp. at 327.

47 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to

2000e-11 (Supp. V, 1976).
48For a discussion of the legislative history of the statute and some of the considerations underlying its passage see note 71 infra.
49404 F. Supp. at 328-29, 331-32. For reference to some of the cases in which
compensatory damages for pain and suffering have been awarded in other discriminatory contexts see note 66 infra.
5042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
51404 F. Supp. at 328 (quoting from Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975)).
52 404 F. Supp. at 328.
53The enforcement provision of the Act, set out in note 8 supra, specifies the
availability of both legal and equitable relief.
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V, 1976). This section provides that, upon finding an intentional violation of the Act, a
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
id.
, 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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tive damages were available under title VII. 5 6 It was noted that Congress, fully aware that neither compensatory nor punitive damages
were compensable under the National Labor Relations Act, 5 7 consciously patterned the relief provisions of title VII after that Act. 5 8
Additionally, the Van Hoomissen court reasoned that since the legislative history of title VII indicated that it was to be enforced in a corrective rather than a punitive manner, the remedies under such a
59
statute should be limited to equitable relief.
Although a number of courts have adopted the view taken in Van
6°
Hoomissen with respect to the remedies available under title VII, it
was held in Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co.6 1 that
compensatory damages for "psychic injuries" could be recovered
under that Act. 62 Rather than relying upon prior decisional law and
legislative history, the Humphrey court chose to effectuate the ultimate purpose of title VII, namely ending discrimination, by allowing

51 Id. at 836, 838. In Van Hoomissen an employee of Xerox claimed that, in retaliation for his efforts to influence his employer to end discriminatory hiring practices directed against Mexican-Americans, he was denied job advancement opportunities, demoted, and ultimately discharged. Id. at 831. Relying upon title VII, the plaintiff sought
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as back pay and reinstatement. Id. The
court denied such relief, however, finding that neither "the general legislative history"
nor the express statutory language could support such a construction. Id. at 837-38.
57 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970). The enforcement provision of the Act states, in
pertinent part, that
[i]f upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the [National Labor Relatibns] Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint
has engaged in or is engaging in any . . . unfair labor practice, then the Board
shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such
person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair
labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter ....

Id. § 160(c).
58 368 F. Supp. at 837. Reference was made to Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938), which held that the Board's affirmative action power was
"remedial, not punitive," so that penalties could not be imposed upon an employer
engaging in an unfair labor practice, even if "the policies of the [National Labor
Relations] Act might be effectuated by such an order." See 368 F. Supp. at 837.
59 368 F. Supp. at 836-38.
60 See, e.g., Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42 (D. Hawaii 1974); Howard v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854, 856 (N.D. Ga. 1974). But see Rosen v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1973) (compensatory damages held
recoverable under title VII, since court felt bound to make victim whole by remedying past discrimination as well as barring same in future).
61 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
62 Id. at 835.
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the aggrieved party to seek both legal and equitable relief. 63 The
holding in Humphrey, however, may well be limited to its facts since
could not be
the traditional equitable remedy of reinstatement
64
granted due to the plaintiff's physical disability.
The Rogers court relied upon the Humphrey decision to support
its analogy of the ADEA to title VII, but failed to acknowledge the
unique factors involved in that case. 65 Nevertheless, the court noted
numerous instances in which such compensatory damages have been
awarded, absent express statutory authorization, in differing discriminatory contexts. 66 Thereafter, although acknowledging the cases
which have denied compensatory damages for pain and suffering
under title VII, 6 7 the court distinguished such authority on the basis
of the differing statutory language of the ADEA and title VII, noting
while title VII
that the ADEA refers to "legal or equitable relief,"
68
relief."
"equitable
of
terms
in
speaks exclusively
In addition to the analogy to title VII, the Rogers court viewed
the legislative history of the ADEA as supporting a construction of
the statute which would include compensatory damages. 69 The history of the Act was viewed as clearly indicating that its proscriptions
were intended to protect not only against mere economic loss due to
arbitrary age discrimination, but also against the less apparent, yet
70
potentially more devastating, damage to the victim's self-esteem.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 843. It was found that under the circumstances "the Court could only
'promote the ends of justice' by granting the requested relief." Id.
65 See 404 F. Supp. at 331-32.
66
1d. at 332. See, e.g., Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th
Cir. 1974) (compensatory awards for emotional distress and humiliation recoverable
under title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970)); Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970) (damages for emotional and mental
distress available for intentional violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Gonzales v. FairfaxBrewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1973), modified, 515 F.2d 1082
(4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 945 (1975) (awards for embarrassment, humiliation,
and mental anguish available under Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)).
67 404 F. Supp. at 333. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 10 F.E.P. 1268
(S.D. Cal. 1975), in which the plaintiff brought suit under the federal civil rights act for
the recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages, alleging discrimination on the
basis of sex in both the hiring and membership policies of the defendant. Id. at
1269-70. In denying the legal relief sought by the plaintiff, the court indicated that it
was reluctant to go beyond the equitable relief exclusively provided for in the statute.
Id. at 1272. Accord, Jiron v. Sperry-Rand Corp., 10 F.E.P. 730, 739 (D. Utah 1975).
68 404 F. Supp. at 333. Compare note 8 supra with note 54 supra.
69 404 F. Supp. at 330.
70 Id. at 328-29, 333. The court's conclusion appears correct, for the legislative his-

tory of the ADEA is replete with references to the psychological ills which frequently
result from age discrimination. Representative Kelly has remarked that " 'the greater
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The court concluded that such a patent legislative intent mandated
an award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering where
factually warranted. 71
It appears that, overall, the court's holding in Rogers is both legally sound and morally equitable. Nevertheless, a number of issues
and policy considerations were not raised in the case and, therefore,
not resolved by the decision. For example, no express reference was
made to the possible alternative of allowing the plaintiff to recover
punitive damages in lieu of a compensatory damage award under the
ADEA. 72 Although there is no existing case law on this precise
issue, 73 the appropriateness of a strictly punitive remedy has been
loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on
these citizens and their families.' " 113 CONG. REc. 34744 (1967) (quoting from Speech
by President Johnson, Older American Message to the Congress, Jan. 23, 1967). See also
113 CONG. REC. 34752 (1967), wherein it was asserted by Representative Dwyer that
discrimination consist[ing] of the blunt, blind refusal, rigid and unbending, to
employ workers once they have passed an arbitrary age, however able or qualified they may be . . . only adds to long-term unemployment, higher relief
costs, and extensive human suffering and despair.
For further information relating to the legislative history surrounding the ADEA see
113 CONG. REC. 31248-57, 34738-55 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); S. REP. No. 707, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768,
and H.R. 4221 Before the Gen. Subcoimn. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
71 404 F. Supp. at 330, 333.
72 Punitive damages are considered to be those sums awarded to plaintiff not to
compensate him for his injuries but to punish the defendant, discourage him from repeating the tortious conduct in the fluture, and deter others from similar actions. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER]. Such damage awards may also serve the function "of reimbursing the
plaintiff for elements of damage which are not legally compensable, such as his
wounded feelings or the expenses of suit," id., or may be viewed as a kind of "bounty"
or reward inducing plaintiffs to bring actions which are in the "public interest" but
which would not otherwise be profitable, DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.9, at 205.
There is no indication that the plaintiff in Rogers actually sought punitive damages,
either in lieu of or in addition to compensatory relief. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief
in Support of Their Claim to Damages at 1-9, Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co.,
404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), wherein the arguments were confined to the recovery of
compensatory damages for mental and physical suffering.
73 There is some support, however, for the allowance of punitive damages in lieu of
compensatory awards in other employment discrimination contexts, absent express
statutory authorization. For example, in Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (D. Neb.
1972), the court allowed a claim for punitive damages under title VII while at the same
time striking down, in a rather conclusory manner, a claim for compensatory damages.
See id. at 18.
For a more detailed discussion of the propriety of allowing punitive damages for
discriminatory employment practices see 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1337, 1338-42 (1974).
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argued in the context of title VII litigation. 74 Specifically, it has been
asserted that punitive damages have an advantage over compensatory
damages in that 1) mental suffering is difficult to prove and cannot be
valued with precision for purposes of a compensatory award; 2) the
availability of the remedy would encourage private individuals to
bring suit; 3) punitive damage awards would be more likely to deter
discriminatory conduct; and 4) punitive damages are fairer to defendants in that they are directly proportional to the outrageousness of the
discriminatory conduct, 75 in contrast to compensatory damages, which
vary with the nature and gravity of the injury to the plaintiff. 76
While there is undoubtedly some merit in such an argument,
one obvious drawback is that punitive damages are traditionally only
available when the defendant's conduct is willful. 7 7 Thus, when an
unlawful act of discrimination was due to mere inadvertence or negligence, its victim would go uncompensated despite the existence of
psychological harm or humiliation. 78 Similarly, if the objectionable
conduct were intentional but not egregious, the damages recoverable
would theoretically be low even if the damages caused to the plaintiff
were of a much greater magnitude. 79 These considerations appear to
militate against the utilization of punitive damages as a substitute for
compensatory damages under the ADEA, especially in view of the
legislative intent of "making whole" individuals damaged by acts of
unlawful discrimination, willful or otherwise. 8 0 Thus, it would seem
that if the focus of the legislation is on alleviating the plight of the
74 See Developments, supra note 26, at 1259-63.
75 Id. at 1260-62. The "outrageousness" of conduct sufficient to justify an award of
punitive damages refers not only to the nature of the defendant's conduct, see DOBBS,
supra note 7, § 3.9, at 204, but also comprehends a particular mental state such that the
defendant either
was actuated by ill will, malice, or evil motive ...
or by fraudulent purposes,
or that he was so wanton and reckless as to evince a conscious disregard of the
rights of others.
C.

MCCORMICK,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES

§ 79, at 280 (1935) (footnotes

omitted).
76 See 1 J. JOYCE & H. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON DAMAGES § 26 (1903). See also note

7 supra.
77 See PROSSER, supra note 72, § 2, at 9.
78 See Comment, Implying Punitive Damages in Employment DiscriminationCases,
9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 325, 368 (1974).

79 Cf. DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.9, at 204. This is implicit in the concept of punitive
damages, which are "awarded . .. because of particularly aggravated misconduct on the
part of the defendant." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also note 75 supra
and accompanying text.
s See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra and notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
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victims of discrimination rather than punishing the discriminating
party, then compensatory damages are properly a part of any enforcement scheme established under the ADEA.
A more interesting question, also not presented in the Rogers
case, is whether punitive damages as well as compensatory damages
should be available to persons who have suffered injury as the result
of acts of discrimination prohibited by the terms of the ADEA. Since
the rationale in Rogers of allowing compensatory damages for pain
and suffering was based, in part, upon the express statutory reference
to legal relief,8 1 an argument may be made that punitive damages,
which have historically been considered legal relief,8 2 should also be
recoverable under the ADEA. Under traditional principles of statutory construction, a court interpreting the ADEA could award punitive as well as compensatory damages either if the literal meaning of
the express language would comprehend such relief or, if the express
language did not clearly settle the question, if the intent behind the
83
statute would support such a construction.
Applying these principles, it appears that if a court considered
the language of the enforcement provision of the ADEA to be clear
on its face, punitive damages could be allowed under the rubric of
"legal relief." If, however, the court referred to the legislative history
.of the statute for such a determination, 8 1 it is questionable whether
punitive damages would or should be allowed. Although the purposes
of the ADEA are rather general, 8 5 it would seem that punitive damages are not consonant with the underlying purpose of the statute to

See 404 F. Supp. at 333.
Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D. Hawaii 1974).
83 See, e.g., Globe Seaways, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 509 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1975).
In that case the court, in construing a portion of a federal act, asserted that it
must not refer to legislative history if the statutory language is cleai. . . . This
salutary doctrine is predicated upon the notion that since Congress is presumed
to have meant what it said, [the court] must look first to the literal meaning of
the words of the statute in order to determine how best to effectuate the Congressional intent. . . . Of course, [the court] must not allow such literalmindedness to lead [it] to absurd or unreasonable conclusions at war with the
very policy that Congress intended to implement in the statute in question.
Id. at 971 (citations omitted).
For a detailed discussion of the varying principles used in the construction of civil
rights statutes see 3 SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§
60.01-.03, 72.05-07 (4th ed. Sands 1974).
84 The Act itself may direct such a reference by authorizing the "grant [of] such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
85 For the congressional statement of intent see note 15 supra.
81
82
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"make whole" the aggrieved party,8 6 since such damages are intended
not to compensate plaintiffs but to punish defendants, and, by so
doing, to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 87
A further issue with respect to the allowance of punitive along
with compensatory damages arises in relation to the express statutory
authorization of liquidated damages. Such damages may be awarded
in an amount equal to the out-of-pocket loss to the party injured by
an unlawful act of discrimination, 8 and have an obviously punitive
quality, in that they are permitted only upon a demonstration of a
willful violation of the statute. 89 The argument could therefore be
made that where Congress has specifically authorized such quasipunitive damages, courts should not construe the legislation to comprehend any further punitive relief. Nevertheless, liquidated damages
do not reflect the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct, as
would true punitive damages 90 but instead result in a mere doubling
of the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff, which loss may have
been mitigated by such fortuitous factors as the value of any retirement benefits received or the amounts earned as the result of other
employment. 9 1 These distinctions may be substantial enough so that
the possibility of permitting the recovery under the ADEA of punitive
damages in the traditional sense should not be dismissed out of hand.
86 See 404 F. Supp. at 328.
87 See PROSSER, supra note 72, § 2, at 9. While punitive damages may be used by a
plaintiff to cover the costs of litigation, including attorneys' fees, see id. at 11, such costs
are not generally recoverable by successful plaintiffs, so that punitive damages would
still be "a windfall to the plaintiff" where awarded, id. at 11, 13.
88 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). This section provides, in pertinent part:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for
subdivision (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section.
Section 216(b) provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of ... this title shall be liable to the
employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages
...and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). Section 626(b) further provides:
Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages . . . for purposes of sections 216 and 217
of this title; Provided, That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases
of willful violations of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
After referring to precisely these sections of the statute, one commentator noted that
"[i]t [was] difficult to understand how such an important remedy could be couched in
language so obscure." Agatstein, supra note 24, at 317-18 & n.62.
89 See note 88 supra.

90 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
91 404 F. Supp. at 329.

1976]

NOTES

With respect to those instances of arbitrary age discrimination
which are beyond the coverage of the ADEA, 9 2 the victims might
challenge such activities on a constitutional basis9 3 where the dis94
criminatory entity is one which is subject to constitutional restraint.
For example, in the recent case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia,95 the Supreme Court was confronted with an equal protection challenge to the actions of an administrative agency taken pur92 For a discussion of the limitations in the coverage of the ADEA see notes 21-25
supra and accompanying text.
93 For a detailed discussion of the increased litigation in this area and a summary of
the due process and equal protection arguments which have been raised see Comment,
Mandatory Retirement: The Law, the Courts, and the Broader Social Context, in Symposium: The Rights of The Disadvantaged, 11 WILLAMETTE L.J. 398, 411-16 (1975);
Note, The Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 748, 762-91 (1975).
94 Where the entity is not subject to the strictures of the constitution, the victim of
the discrimination may seek the protections of state age discrimination laws, which exist
in many jurisdictions. In New Jersey, for example, not only is there a statutory proscription against discrimination in employment on the basis of age, but the coverage of the
statute also extends to individuals twenty-one years of age and over, with no upper age
limitation. Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 et seq. (Supp.
1976-77). Although the enforcement powers of the act are entrusted to the Division of
Civil Rights, the statutory scheme allows private individuals to vindicate their rights
and seek damages under the statute. See Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62
N.J. 399, 416, 301 A.2d 754, 763 (1973) (compensatory damages for pain and suffering,
together with out-of-pocket loss, recoverable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination for discrimination on the basis of sex); Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., 137 N.J.
Super. 537, 541-42, 350 A.2d 65, 67-68 (App. Div. 1975).
For more detailed information regarding the various state statutory proscriptions
against age discrimination in employment see EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 24, at 32-58; Kovarsky, Irving & Kovarsky, Economic,
Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age DiscriminationLaws in Employment, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 839, 915-25 (1974); Comment, supra note 93, at 405 & n.30.
In view of the existence of such statutory schemes for the redress of discrimination
in employment on the basis of age, the issue arises whether a litigant must exhaust any
available state remedies before proceeding under the ADEA. The statute itself provides,
in part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a
law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing
or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory
practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.
29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1970) (emphasis added). From this language, it is unclear whether a
plaintiff contemplating an action under the ADEA must first resort to state law, or must
merely wait 60 days to initiate a federal proceeding if prior resort to state law has been
made. However, the two federal appellate courts which have considered the issue found
that utilization of state enforcement procedures, where they exist, is a prerequisite to an
action in federal court under the ADEA. See Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d
691, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1975); Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974).
95 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
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suant to a state statute making the retirement of police officers mandatory at age fifty. 9 6 The Court found that the provision in question
rationally advanced the state's objective of "protect[ing] the public by
assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police," and, accordingly, was not violative of the constitution. 97 As noted by the dissent,
however, the Court did not hold that every mandatory retirement
policy would be constitutional, so that in a case where age was not
reasonably related to job performance, the victim of the discrimination could still consider mounting a constitutional challenge. 98
One final question may be raised in connection with the decision
of the Rogers court as to the relief available under the ADEA. Specifically, it is unclear whether a plaintiff who-unlike the plaintiff in
Rogers-is available and able to work may obtain the equitable remedy of reinstatement with back pay in addition to the legal remedy of
damages, or whether such a plaintiff must elect one remedy or the
other. 99 Whatever the answer, it is clear that a significant segment of
the populace is now afforded extensive relief for both physical and
psychological damage resulting from arbitrary differentiation in employment based upon age. 10 0 Hopefully, the decision in Rogers will
prompt employers to comply voluntarily with the statutory guidelines
and deal with both present and prospective employees on the basis of
their experience and ability, and not on the basis of chronological age
alone.

Richard M. Chisholn
96Id. at 2564-65. For reasons not explained by the Court, no claim for relief was
asserted under the ADEA. Id. at 2565 n.2.
97 Id. at 2567-68 (footnote omitted). In reaching this result, the Court reaffirmed its
reliance upon the traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis. Id. at 2566-68. Under
this analysis, legislative classifications which are based upon "suspect" categories or
which infringe upon a "fundamental right" are subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny" and
must be justified by a "compelling state interest" in order to be sustained. See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). All other classifications
need only be rationally related to the purpose of the legislation in order to be upheld.
See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-87 (1970). The Murgia Court applied the
rational basis test since, in its view, aged persons were not a suspect class and the right
to government employment per se was not fundamental. 96 S. Ct. at 2566-67.
For a review of the two-tiered analysis of equal protection see Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969).
98 See 96 S. Ct. at 2573 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99 For a general discussion of the election of remedies and of the prerequisites for
the grant of any equitable relief see DOBBS, supra note 7, § 1.5, at 13-23, § 2.1, at 27.
100 It was recently reported that approximately forty-six percent of the population in
the United States is between forty and sixty-five years of age, and it has been estimated
that by 1990 approximately 63,000,000 persons will be within the coverage of the
ADEA. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 24, Table 2, at
28.

